Online experiments allow researchers to collect datasets at times not typical of laboratory studies.
Introduction
Online survey platforms are an increasingly popular tool for studying human behavior in the social sciences. Since the appearance of Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a plethora of studies have validated their use by successfully replicating classic findings from economics and psychology (Paolacci et al. 2010; Horton et al. 2011; Amir et al. 2012; Berinsky et al. 2012; Rand 2012; Arechar et al. 2016) . In comparison to other methods, online surveys permit quick and affordable collection of large volumes of data.
Another feature of these online studies is that they make it easy to collect data at any time and, unlike studies conducted in the laboratory or in other face-to-face environments, participation can easily occur late at night or on weekends. This is possible because researchers commonly leave a single study continuously open for a week or longer, allowing participation at whichever time suits participants.
A potential issue arising from this practice, however, is heterogeneity in participants' characteristics based on time of participation. There is evidence in support of such heterogeneity; for example, people who work in traditional white collar jobs may be unavailable to complete studies during regular business hours. As a result, studies run during those hours may be more likely to recruit "professional" participants who use MTurk as a primary source of income -and thus may have more prior experience (Casey et al. 2016) , make fewer errors (Chandler et al. 2015) , and complete studies more quickly (Deetlefs et al. 2015) . Additionally, participants recruited when a study is first posted may differ from those recruited later, as in college samples where there is evidence that students differ depending on whether they sign up to complete studies at the beginning versus the end of the semester (Aviv et al. 2002) . Indeed, in an unincentivized survey study, Casey et al. (2016) explore the demographic and personality differences of participants who took part in surveys at different times on MTurk. Notably, they find that experienced participants were more likely to complete tasks earlier in the day, and that participants tend to be older, less neurotic and more conscientious earlier in the data collection.
Still, little is known about how participants' behavior may vary based on time of participation, and this is crucial knowledge for accurately interpreting the results of online studies. To shed light on this issue, we ran an incentivized study at regular intervals over two weeks to explore how participation at day versus night, and on weekdays versus the weekend, affects incentivized behavior in common economic paradigms, as well as the demographics and personality of those who self-select to participate.
Participants took part in a series of tasks presented in randomized order. They made seven incentivized decisions: a dictator game, a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game, and a third-party punishment game with prosocial punishment of selfishness and antisocial punishment of fairness, as well as an honesty task, a charitable giving decision, and a time discounting task. In addition to these incentivized measures, they also completed unincentivized measures of reflectiveness (a modified version of the cognitive reflection test, CRT; Frederick (2005) ), the Big-5 personality traits of openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (Gosling et al. 2003) , and basic demographics.
We do not find significant differences in decisions in any of the incentivized behavioral measures. However, we do find that people participating at night are less experienced, take more time to complete tasks, are less conscientious, and more neurotic than their daytime fellows; and that people participating on weekends are less experienced and reflective. We also examine behavioral and demographic differences based on participation order. We find no differences in any of the incentivized measures, with the exception of charitable giving, where people participating earlier on in the study give less. We also find that such participants are more experienced, reflective, and agreeable than later ones. Of course, our results cannot speak to causality. A person's characteristics could be influencing when they select into participation in studies on MTurk, or there could be a causal effect such that the same person tends to be, for example, less reflective on the weekend compared to weekdays. Although this distinction is important for understanding the psychological basis of our observations, the direction of causality does not have particular bearing on the practical implications for experimenters interested in running experiments on nights and weekends using MTurk.
In sum, our results suggest that incentivized economic behavior on MTurk is robust to the time of day and the day of the week, while there is some variation in participants' personality and prior experience across these recruitment times.
Experimental design and procedure
We recruited participants via MTurk, restricting their geographical location to the USA. A total of 2,336 American participants completed the study; average age was 34 years (range: 18-77), and 50% were female. Participants completed the task in an average of 15 minutes and they received a flat fee of $1 for participating, plus an additional variable payment (average $0.52, range: $0.02-$60) depending on their choices in the study -both amounts were in range of what was common Mturk practice at the time. We prevented repeated participation by excluding an additional 90 observations from duplicate Amazon worker IDs or IP addresses.
We collected data over a span of two separate weeks in November and December 2014, launching a total of 84 sessions. 1 We classified participation time as day (night) if the study was completed between 8am and 8pm (8pm and 8am). We classified participation day as weekend if the study was completed between the start of Friday night and the end of Sunday day, and weekday otherwise. In total, 844 participants took part during weekday-day, 819 during weekday-night, 345
during weekend-day, and 328 during weekend-night.
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We analyzed time of participation using participants' experienced time. To achieve this, we retrieved the participants' locations from their IP addresses, and adjusted their timestamp for their time zone (data were timestamped in the Eastern Time Zone because we are located there). As Figure 1 shows, most of our data (75%) originates from locations in the Eastern and Central Time Zones, which is consistent with 2014 Census estimates and recent evidence showing that MTurk can be more representative than in-person convenience samples (Berinsky et al. 2012 ).
1 Each session was closed after 30 participants accepted the HIT or 1 hour had elapsed, and participants had a maximum of one hour to complete the study. The first week (11/19-11/15) had 28 sessions launched every 6 hours starting at 00:00 EST; the second week (12/8-12/15) had 56 sessions launched every 3 hours starting at 09:00 EST. This difference in granularity is not relevant for our analyses of day versus night, which uses 12-hour blocks.
2 Unless otherwise stated, we found qualitatively similar results when the 12-hours night was defined as beginning at 7pm or at 9pm, or if we define weekend as the time between the start of Saturday day and the start of Monday day. would be generated by the computer and then self-reported accuracy, with more reported accuracy leading to higher earnings (up to $0.50); and time discounting (TD). 5 To account for potential income effects, we randomized the order in which each task was presented at the individual level and informed participants that only one of the tasks would be randomly selected for payment after all were completed. All materials used neutral wording and the economic games included comprehension questions. See the online appendix for a copy of the instructions.
Finally, participants completed a 10-item version of the Big-5 measure capturing five dimensions of personality (O, openness; C, conscientiousness; E, extroversion; A, agreeableness; N, neuroticism (reverse-coded); from Gosling et al. 2003) , a modified version of the cognitive reflection test to assess intuitive versus deliberative cognitive style (a set of three math problems with intuitively compelling but incorrect answers; original introduced by Frederick (2005) , modified by Shenhav et al. 2012) , and a set of standard demographic questions. 3 We used a continuous implementation of the PD (as in Capraro et al. 2014 ) such that each player received a $0.40 endowment and chose how much to transfer to the other person, with any transfer doubled by the experimenters. 4 In the third-party punishment game, Player 1 chose whether or not to evenly split $0.50 with Player 2. The participant, in the role of Player 3, then chose how much of a $0.10 endowment to spend on punishing Player 1 (with each cent reducing Player 1's payoff by 3 cents) if Player 1 did not (3P) or did (AP) split the $0.50. Participants in our study played only in the role of the third player (which was our decision of interest). We did not deceive participants, however -a small number of Players 1 and 2 were recruited separately and repeatedly matched with Player 3s (as per Stagnaro et al. 2017) . 5 We used a short version of the discounting task developed by Kirby et al. (1999) , where participants chose 9 different monetary allocations between a smaller reward and a larger, delayed reward (e.g. "Would you rather have $25 today or $60 in 14 days"). Log-transformed values reported in all analyses. One participant was selected at random to have one of their choices implemented. Because of the instructions stating "At the end of the study one participant and one question will be selected randomly. The winner will receive the associated bonus according to the choice made", we had assumed that participants understood "today" to mean "at the end of the study" On reflection, we realize that this (unintentional) poor execution on our part might have been misunderstood by the participants.
Results

Time and Day
Incentivized Behaviors
We begin with our central (null) result: Figure 2 shows the difference in mean behavior in each of the seven incentivized decisions between day and night, and between weekday and weekend. 6 For the games with comprehensions questions-DG, PG and 3P-we exclude participants who answered incorrectly, but the results are qualitatively similar if included.
Although DG giving and donations to charity tend to be larger at nights (uncorrected p=0.032 and p=0.015, respectively), and antisocial punishment tends to be larger on weekends (uncorrected p=0.018), none of these differences survive even a modest Bonferroni correction for seven 6 We report only main effects because preliminary ANOVAs reveal no significant interaction between a dummy for night versus day and weekend versus weekday. See Appendix Table A1 for significance levels of all the variables and Appendix Figure A1 for their distributions.
simultaneous tests (which would require p<.007), let alone a more stringent correction for 21 tests that accounts for the 3 coefficients in each model.
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As our central findings are null results, we also conducted power analysis calculations. Setting the default power to 0.80 for three levels of alpha, based on the degree of conservativeness in Bonferroni correction (=0.05; =0.007; =0.0024), we find that we had sufficient power to detect economically meaningful differences (differences of at least 5 percentage points for most measures even using the more conservative level of Bonferroni correction) in all but three cases:
PD and 3P for all the alphas and HO for the most conservative one. See Appendix Table A2 for details.
We also ask how variance (rather than mean values) differs by day and time. The only difference we find that survive Bonferroni correction is that variance in antisocial punishment is lowest on weekday days, followed by weekday nights, and then higher in the two weekend timeslots. See Appendix Figure A2 for details.
Taken together, these results do not provide evidence that incentivized behavior in economic decisions on MTurk varies meaningfully with time or day.
Demographics and Personality traits
To investigate demographic and personality variations across time and day, we perform an ANOVA on each of the eighteen variables shown in Figure 3 , with a night dummy, a weekend dummy, and the interaction between the two. whereas people who participated on weekends were less experienced (weekday: 2.49 log(studies); 7 We also test those seven null results for robustness to demographic and personality controls in stepwise regressions (Appendix Table A3 ). We find that such controls have no effect on the non-significance of the time/day coefficients. 8 There were no significant interactions for the demographics, Figure 3 shows means for each condition to allow readers to see the absolute levels (which may be of general interest).
weekend: 2.32 log(studies); p<0.001), less likely to be participating during their usual MTurk work times (weekday: 83%; weekend: 74%; p<0.001), and were less reflective (CRT correct answers;
weekday: 1.57; weekend: 1.36; p<0.001).
Robustness Checks
To ensure the robustness of our results we perform the following three robustness checks:
The direction of the results does not change when splitting the data into two:
We divide our dataset into two based on whether the participant's serial order is odd or even. The incentivized economic behaviors that were strongly null in the full dataset are similarly null in each half.
For DG and CH, which were weakly significantly (i.e. did not survive Bonferroni correction) larger at night than during the day in the full dataset, these results were not consistently apparent in both halves of the data, further indicating lack of robustness. For AP, which was weakly significantly higher on weekends than weekdays in the full dataset, we observe the same result in both halves, suggesting that this result might be more robust. Finally, considering the significant demographic/personality results that were significant in the full dataset, the results were similar in the two halves (see Appendix Figure A3 ).
Finer-grained definitions of time and day of the week:
For participation time we focus on four 6-hour intervals: morning, between 8am and 2pm; afternoon, between 2pm and 8pm; evening, between 8pm and 2am; and pre-dawn, between 2am and 8am. For day of the week we classify each day of the seven-day week separately (Monday-Sunday). Using these new definitions, we perform an ANOVA (with Bonferroni corrections) on all of the behavioral, demographic, and personality items. Doing so recovers all of the results described above using the more coarsegrained measures of time and day, with the only exceptions that neuroticism did not vary with time of day. We also found two new results that were not significant using the more coarsegrained analysis: participants at pre-dawn gave more generous donations to charity compared to the other times of day (pre-dawn: $13.38; not pre-dawn: $10.90, p<0.001), and age varied with time of day such that participants during the evening were younger while participants during pre-dawn were older (evening: 32.95; not evening: 35.74; p=0.002; pre-dawn: 35.74; not pre-dawn: 33.71; p<0.001). We note that the result regarding charitable giving was also evident in the coarse-grained analysis (Figure 2 ), but was only significant at the 5% level in that analysis (and thus did not survive Bonferroni correction). and the relationship between passing comprehension checks and spending time on the task at weekends gains significance when WS is used (from p=0.001 to p<0.001 and from p=0.007 to p<0.001, respectively). See Table A1 for a complementary analysis of all remaining tasks.
Participant order
Finally, we test whether participants who take part in a study early on differ from those who participate later in the course of the study (and thus how important it is to have full randomization over all treatments of an experiment, versus running some treatments after others have been completed). We run regressions on each of the measures presented in the previous section using the chronological order in which participants accessed our study as the independent variable.
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After Bonferroni corrections, we find that this variable predicts significant changes in five measures. To give a sense of the magnitude of these changes, we report values predicted from the regression models for the first participant (participant 1) and for the last participant (participant 2,336). We find that later-participating individuals are less experienced (b=-0. z-scored response, a 0.3 standard deviation decrease). We also note that when controlling for experience, the only difference that remains significant is agreeableness (b=-0.0001, p<0.001).
Discussion
We investigated whether participants' economic game behavior, as well as demographics and personality factors, varied based on time of day and day of the week. Our key results are nulls:
there are no significant differences on any of the incentivized economic behaviors. With respect to the non-incentivized measures, we do find that people participating on weekends were less reflective and less experienced, and less experienced, conscientious, and more neurotic when participating at night. Our finer-grained analysis also revealed more charitable giving between 2am and 8am. In addition to exploring time of day and day of the week effects, we also compared subjects who participated earlier in the study with those who participated later. We found laterparticipating subjects to have less prior experience, less reflectiveness, more charitable giving and less agreeableness.
With respect to the non-incentivized measures, a comparison between our results and those of Casey et al. (2016) reveals substantial convergence: both papers find more experienced participants earlier in the day and earlier in the data collection process, that participants who scored lower on the Big-5 personality dimension of conscientiousness were more likely to complete HITs later in the day, and that participants tended to score higher in the Big-5 personality dimension of agreeableness earlier in the data collection process.
We also note that our null result regarding time of day and honesty is inconsistent with prior work suggesting that people are more honest in the mornings (Kouchaki and Smith 2014) . It is possible that this inconsistency results from the use of somewhat different honesty measures, or from some feature of how MTurk workers self-select into time of day for participation (e.g. their chronotype, as argued by Gunia et al. 2014) . A more general point regarding our null results is that our games used instructions which were much shorter than is typical for experimental economics, which could have led to more noise; however, we did screen for comprehension of the game payoffs, and prior work with the same short instructions has successfully observed correlations between game play and various other factors (Peysakhovich et al., 2014) . Finally, we note that there was some evidence of more giving in the DG and charitable donation in the night relative to the day, but these differences were only significant when not including Bonferroni correction.
Future work could assess whether our null findings for these measures replicate.
Broadly, our results suggest that researchers using MTurk to explore economic behavior need not be especially concerned about running studies during the day versus the night, or on weekdays versus weekends, or even without full randomization across treatments. This frees researchers to make fuller use of MTurk's ease of recruitment, collecting participants around the clock and throughout the week -and potentially comparing treatments and studies conducted at different times (although we note that lack of full randomization always introduces the possibility of threats to causal inference and encourage researchers to randomize across all conditions). However, if participants' level of prior experience, charitable giving, reflectiveness, agreeableness, neuroticism or consciousness seem likely to impact task performance (or, more importantly, interact with treatment effects for a given study, e.g. as in Rand et al. (2014) and Chandler et al. (2015) ), researchers should use full randomization across treatments and be mindful of when they launch online studies. Stepwise forward estimation for models with demographic and personality controls. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. We performed preliminary regressions with a night and weekend interaction, none of them were significant. All controls had pairwise correlations within a ±0.37 range. DG: Dictator Game; PD: Prisoner's dilemma; CH: Charity task; HO: Honesty task; 3P: (Prosocial) Third-party punishment; AP: (Antisocial) Third-party punishment; TD: (log) Time discounting task. CRT: Cognitive reflective task; O: Openness; C: Conscientiousness; E: Extraversion; A: Agreeableness; N: Neuroticism. 
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Experimental Instructions
Breaks between pages shown as long lines. This experiment consists of several sections. In each section you will be called to make one or more decisions. We don't want what happens in one section to affect your decisions in another. So at the end of the study we will randomly choose one section and use its outcomes to determine your bonus payment. Thus, because only one interaction will count, but you don't know which one it will be, you should treat each decision as if it is the only one that matters for your final payoff. When you are ready for the first section, press >> to continue.
New Section
In this section, you will play in a three-person game. You have been randomly assigned to interact with two other MTurk workers. You will be Player 3. The other people will be Players 1 and 2. All three of you receive this same set of instructions. You cannot participate in this interaction again: you can only play this game once. In addition to the payment you each receive for participating in this HIT, you can earn more as a bonus, as follows: In Stage 1:
• Player 1 is given 50 cents.
• Player 1 decides how many of the 50 cents to share with Player 2. Player 1 can share either 0 or 25 cents.
• Player 3 receives 50 cents (no matter what Player 1 chooses). In Stage 2:
• Player 3 can then spend up to 10 cents to reduce Player 1's bonus. For every cent Player 3 spends, Player 1 loses 3 cents. Player 1's total bonus is therefore the money Player 1 keeps minus the money Player 3 causes Player 1 to lose. Player 2's total bonus is therefore the money Player 1 transfers to Player 2. Player 3's total bonus is therefore 50 cents minus the money Player 3 spends on reducing Player 1's bonus.
Please answer the following questions, to make sure you understand the game. You MUST answer ALL questions correctly to receive your bonus! 
Player 1 chose to keep 25 cents and give 25 cents to Player 2?
The choice that you make on this page will determine how much bonus you and Player 1 actually receive. Once the HIT is over, we will calculate bonuses and you will be told what Player 1 chose in Stage 1. We will see how much you wanted to spend to reduce Player 1's bonus given Player 1's actual choice. Then, we will reduce Player 1's bonus based on that decision. We will also determine your bonus based on that decision.
In this section one participant selected randomly from this study can earn $60. How much of this $60 bonus you would like to donate to Oxfam if you win it? (Oxfam is a non-governmental organization that focuses on hunger, poverty, and similar global issues. You will keep the money that you do not donate.) 
In this task, your pay will be determined by whether you correctly guess a randomly drawn number between 1 and 20. Please read the instructions.
On the next page, you will see a randomly generated number between 1 and 20. Before seeing the number, you will be asked to guess the number you are about to see (a number between 1-20). After seeing the number, you will report whether your guess was correct or incorrect. Your bonus for this task will be paid as follows: --If your guess is correct, you will earn $0.50 --For every number by which you are off, you will earn $0.05 less --If you are off by 10 or more numbers, you will earn $0.00 Please choose how many cents you will send to the other person: ______
In this section one participant selected randomly from this study can earn up to $60. Please read the following paragraphs carefully. For each of the following 10 questions you decide whether you prefer to be paid a certain amount today or a larger amount later. You must select one option for each question.
At the end of the study one participant and one question will be selected randomly. The winner will receive the associated bonus according to the choice made. Please answer the questions quickly and honestly. If it takes 10 second for 10 printers to print out 10 pages of paper, how many seconds will it take 50 printers to print out 50 pages of paper?
On a loaf of bread, there is a patch of mold. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 40 days for the patch to cover the entire loaf of bread, how many days would it take for the patch to cover half of the loaf of bread?
What is your age? Unlike some other requesters on Mechanical Turk, we never use deception in our studies. Your actions and the actions of others in the study really did affect the bonuses that other individuals will earn. For our own records, to what extent did you believe that the other people were real when making your decision?  1 -Very skeptical that others were real  2  3  4  5  6  7 -Very confident that others were real
